

PALESTINE

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THE BRITISH PALESTINE COMMITTEE SEEKS TO RESET
THE ANCIENT GLORIES OF THE JEWISH NATION IN THE
FREEDOM OF A NEW BRITISH DOMINION IN PALESTINE

*"If he [Lord Beaconsfield] had freed the Holy Land, and restored the
Jews, as he might have done, instead of pottering about with Roumelia
and Afghanistan, he would have died Dictator."*—"THE SPECTATOR."



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PALESTINE

The Reception of the Declaration

THE Government's pledge to establish a Jewish National Home in Palestine has made a very deep and very wide impression. The Press and public men of all shades and schools of thought have hastened to welcome it and to appreciate its notable significance. It would, indeed, be difficult to find any other concrete war aim the publication of which has received such unanimous approval. Journals as various as the *Manchester Guardian*, the *Globe*, the *Observer*, the *Daily News*, the *Chronicle*, the *Scotsman*, the *Liverpool Post*—to mention only a few—unite in pronouncing the restoration of the Jewish nation to Palestine a most memorable decision. Nor is it only the political organs, but the religious organs are equally emphatic. The establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine is recognised to be a great political and a great moral end. It is a great political end because it is the ideal solution of the vast problems bound up for the British Empire with its sea-way between East and West. When the war began the true character of these problems was generally misapprehended. It is easy to understand why. For over a century certainly (since 1791 when Pitt threatened war on Russia) British policy rested on the assumption that the best bulwark of British communications with the East

was Turkey. It was not generally seen that after the Congress of Berlin, and notably the British occupation of Egypt, Turkey began to drift steadily away from England towards Germany. Even when Turkey allied herself with Germany against us there were many English public men and publicists who found it difficult to shake off an exhausted tradition. All that is now definitely past. The Government and all men of weight (unless there still survive a few melancholy faithful of the old school) now know that our new world situation demanded a revolution in policy. We no longer lean on the Turk. We rest on the revival and the restoration of the nations and the lands over which the Turk tyrannised—Armenian, Arab, Jew. It is not presumptuous for the British Palestine Committee and *Palestine* to claim that they have played their part in this work of education and conversion. We shall of course, continue our labours until the task we have set ourselves is completed, and the new order arises out of the devastation which constituted the Ottoman Empire.

The moral significance of a Jewish Palestine is as apparent as the political. This war has expanded men's understanding of the nature and the value of nationality. We no longer live on a few phrases handed down from Mazzini and the "Age of Enlightenment," which even when they were first formulated, were very rough approximations, a very inadequate summation of a very restricted number of facts, and to-day do not help at all. People now understand that you do not solve the problem of the Jewish people by inviting the most ancient and obstinate of the nations to assimilate utterly and disappear. They see that this cannot be and that it would be a great loss to the world if it could. The Jewish nation as a nation, with its recovered spiritual freedom, exercised where it can alone be exercised in the ancient Jewish land—this is seen

to be one of the pregnant things of the future. The British Government's Declaration in favour of a Jewish Palestine is, in the eyes of the whole world, a new and most remarkable reaffirmation of the moral purpose and the justice of the Allied cause. The Central Powers, had they thought fit, might have done this. They have not done. They have left it to England to do, and that, as it makes the glory of England, burns the brand deeper upon Germany.

German writers have flooded their Press with suggestions that England is free with fine-sounding promises the redemption of which is beyond her powers or a remote improbability. Not even the most stupid and malicious of Germans can say this of the British Government's Declaration in favour of a Jewish Palestine. By a happy conjuncture it was issued at the very moment when the British army resumed that attack which is so rapidly and so brilliantly redeeming Palestine from Turkish tyranny. The soldier set his seal upon the diplomatist; the deed ratifies the word. England has the power as well as the will to carry out the Declaration. Nor, we may be sure, will the process of realisation be delayed one hour longer than is practicable. As soon as expedient it will march parallel with the progress of the army.

Jews have aptly compared the Declaration with that Proclamation of Cyrus, King of Persia, which put an end to the first Exile. The tiny clique by the Thames who fought against its issue (as their prototypes doubtless did by the waters of Babylon against the Proclamation of Cyrus) still grumble, but they stand in bitter and humiliating isolation. No living Jew has known such a sentiment of exaltation from any political happening as the Declaration has spread throughout the hosts of Jewry. We should have to go back to the days of Ezra for the like. It is as

a re-birth. Every Jewish institution—synagogues, friendly societies, trade unions—is hastening to express its heartfelt gratitude and to reaffirm its devotion to the British Government for this memorable act of national liberation. To the modern manifestations of meetings and resolutions there follows the age-old way of solemn thanksgiving in the houses of worship. In the United States, as throughout the British Empire, there is the same tidal wave of devotion and recognition, and when the veil imposed by the present turmoil upon Russia is lifted we shall learn of the same flood of emotion there. It is not limited to the Allies, though in the Allied countries it finds freest utterance. But wherever national sentiment beats in a Jewish breast (and where does it not?) the Declaration of the British Government is felt as the rising of the sun upon the night of the world.

There are Germans who profess to believe that British, American, and Allied interest in a Jewish Palestine is only a cunning and insincere device to rally Jewish sentiment for the purpose and the duration of the war. They show a strange misapprehension (a misapprehension which cannot survive the issue of the Declaration and the onward sweep of General Allenby), but they show a just understanding of the political view of the policy of the Allies. Though the Allies have not pledged themselves to a Jewish Palestine out of calculations of tactical expediency, they have in obedience to the ideal also struck upon the road to political advantage. What is just here at least is also profitable. The Germans are right in their discovery that the universal appeal in Jewry is the appeal of a Jewish Palestine. Events will prove it—to their cost.

The Advance in Palestine

THE campaign in Palestine makes rapid progress. The events of the early part of the week have indicated clearly the character of General Allenby's plan of campaign and the progress since reported shows that so far he has attained his objects. The degree and character of the resistance which the Turks have offered throw also some further light on the nature of their general plans for dealing with their whole Eastern front during this campaigning season.

From the moment when the Gaza positions were abandoned the object of the Turks was to hold the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, on which, together with the new line linking up the Hedjaz railway with Jerusalem, their position in Southern Palestine depended. The attacking army, however, enjoyed some definite advantages. The few miles of level country, broken only by occasional wadies, which divide the sea-coast from the hills, offer a weak flank to an invading army, especially one well supplied with cavalry and light guns, and General Allenby's plan was to push up the plain, throwing his left wing forward, and then to drive in a wedge towards the point where the Jaffa line joins that from Damascus to Beersheba. The taking of this point, which was announced on Thursday evening, marked the second stage of our offensive, the capture of the Gaza positions being the first.

As soon as the junction was reached, the Turkish position, both north and south, was threatened. To the south, the line was strung out in a long curve running below

Beit-Jibrin, a centre of important roads, and swinging round through the high country south of Hebron. The driving in of the wedge was not in itself sufficient to bring about the fall of these positions, for the Turkish troops, in whatever proportion they depended on one railway or the other, had good roads by which they could fall back towards Jerusalem. But it was certain that if the wedge were driven beyond the railway junction and pushed still further north-east, they must begin either to shorten their front in order to maintain it unbroken and so fall back on a more compact line nearer to Jerusalem, or else, if they preferred to stand their ground, run the risk of having their front definitely broken and of being divided up into two separate forces. It would be too confident to assume that even this division, if accomplished, would of itself prove fatal, for the Hedjaz-Jerusalem railway should be sufficient to supply the limited front dependent on it. What the Turks had to fear was that General Allenby, in crossing the railway, driving in his wedge still deeper, and dividing their forces into separate groups, would put himself in a position to attack each on the flank and roll it back, the one from the East, the other from the West.

There are clearly such opportunities, even in the direction of Jerusalem, difficult though the country may be. From the point on the railway where General Allenby struck it, a good road runs north-eastwards and crosses, at intervals of a few miles, the road from Jaffa to Jerusalem. A day's march would bring the British troops from the railway to Latron and Amwas, on the Jaffa road; another day to the first road from Lydd; half a day more to Lower Beth Horon, on the second road. None of these places is more than some fifteen miles from Jerusalem, and at each of them General Allenby would threaten increasingly the communications in the rear of Jerusalem. Lower Beth

Horon is, as the crow flies, only some twelve miles from Jerusalem and only eight from the road which runs into the city from the north. To say this does not, of course, state more than a small part of the problem. The places named are only on the skirts of the mountains. Lower Beth Horon, which stands highest, is only 1,300 feet, and all the few miles to Jerusalem are full of mountains as high as Snowdon's neighbours. We do not know yet that it is any part of General Allenby's plans to plunge into these hills and strike at Jerusalem from the north. But there is no reason why the project should be impracticable. This war has shown that mountains are not now the obstacle they were supposed to be. What could be done in Serbia can be done in Palestine, especially if the attacking side can bring to bear superior numbers, guns, and transport—the means by which mountainous Serbia was so quickly overrun. We are much mistaken if those advantages are not at present on our side in Palestine.

There is another reason, too, why General Allenby might not be contented simply to push up to Haifa, leaving the Turks comfortably based in the mountains and overlooking the plain. They would be dangerous there. At Hebron, or at Beit Jibrin, or even at points further back, they are full on the flank of his main line of advance, and if he left them there he would be casting many an anxious glance back over his shoulder. The thrust at the railway must certainly have had among its objects that of suggesting to the Turks at Beit Jibrin that the time had come to be thinking of their own security. Napoleon's march through Palestine is sometimes quoted in this connection, but as a proof that the modern Palestine can be mastered by a simple occupation of the coastal plain, the analogy is useless. Railways and the telegraphs, not to speak of the multiplication of numbers and of guns, have changed the

conditions which made it possible for Napoleon, with an army that was no bigger than a modern cavalry reconnaissance in force, to hurry from El Arish to Gaza, Jaffa, and Acre in less than a month, and to stop for two months, isolated, in the north. He could neglect the possibility of attacks upon his flank from the Judæan hills. With railways traversing the country from north to south, and with the great size of modern armies, the General who sought to copy Napoleon would be inviting trouble. General Allenby will secure his flank, and in all probability he will use the threat of the wedge which he is thrusting northwards from the Jaffa line to manœuvre the Turks gradually back towards Jerusalem. How *far* he will push the threat: whether he will be content to free his flank from the immediate danger of counter-attack and push on northwards with the ultimate intention of encircling the Judæan mountains from the north, no one can yet say. It depends on his knowledge of the Turkish strength and his estimate of the counter-attack which, with these railways between them, they ought to be able to make from the direction of Jerusalem. His problem is in some ways that of General Maude who had to decide how far he dare advance up the Tigris with the possibility of an attack on his flank from the Jebel Hamrin hills. Only, the Turks in the Judæan hills are nearer and better supplied, and General Allenby may decide that only when they are out of Jerusalem will he be safe. At all events, what is certain is that a thrust into the mountains behind Jerusalem is not impossible.

The other result of General Allenby's blow at the railway will be the fall of Jaffa. There is no good line of defence north of the Wadi Suras, which was crossed on Tuesday, and with the capture of Lydd (the northerly junction of the Jaffa and the Damascus lines), Jaffa has

been cut off from support by rail. Here again, if General Allenby succeeds in dividing the Turkish army we shall soon know of it. For if he does, he will have in each case a flank to strike at and out-manœuvre—a gift the soldier prays for and in this war has so rarely been blessed with, except on the Eastern front. If the Turks are found with a short front and an exposed flank, General Allenby has some of the finest horsemen at his disposal to seize the opportunity.

Of the difficulties on the way up from Joppa to Haifa it is possible to speak with some certainty. The only natural barriers in the plain are the water-courses like those from which (Sukereir and Surar) the Turks were driven early in the week, and it is a curious geographical point that in almost every case these wadies in their lower reaches take a northward bend which lies, as it were, on the flank of the upper stream. This peculiarity greatly helps the attacking side when the Turk elects to stand on the northern bank of the Wadi. Thus, when the Turks made their first stand on the Wadi Sukereir, General Allenby's mounted men pushed up into the angle near the mouth and, crossing at several points, secured ground from which they immediately threatened the Turkish positions lying to the south-east. The same plan would no doubt have been followed at the Wadi Surar had not the Turks been pursued so vigorously that the British crossed the central part of the Wadi immediately behind them, apparently, before the bridge could be destroyed. North of Jaffa the Turks will suffer from the same disadvantage, and, unless they are heavily reinforced, their prospects of defending the plain do not seem to be good.

Remembering always that the Palestine and the Bagdad fronts are one, what light do the last week's events throw on the fascinating problem of the Turkish plans?

On the whole, they seem to confirm the view that the **Turks** intend to stand on the defensive in Palestine and have allotted to this front the minimum number of troops needed, as they think, to play this part, while throwing all their weight into an effort to recover Bagdad. There is no indication as yet of any large Turkish reserves coming into the field in Palestine, although some fresh troops are reported, and it is time, for the Gaza army has suffered heavy losses in proportion to its size. On any other hypothesis than that the Turks hoped simply to hold us back we should have expected signs before this of a new concentration. Nor, worthless though such reports usually are, can we altogether reject in this connection the statement that Djemal Pasha, speech-making in Jerusalem, remarked that no town was absolutely safe and that even his troops might perhaps have to retreat. Djemal, we may be sure, would have no love for a German-made plan which sacrificed his command to the hopes of a victory at Bagdad. Note also that General Maude is not pursuing the Turks on the Tigris towards Mosul, but has fallen back to his former positions. He is, beyond doubt, awaiting the appearance of the enemy in force among the hills on his right flank—the threat which should have coincided with attacks along the Euphrates and the Tigris. His policy is obviously sound, but it certainly indicates the coming of a Turkish offensive on a large scale. And that is what we should expect, since the plans must have been fixed in the spring, and since, with such great distances in question, they cannot easily be recast with effect, even though things go wrong in Palestine. But if things go very wrong and Jerusalem is in danger, would not the Turks, at any cost, modify their plans and abandon their Bagdad offensive? The Turks, certainly, but it does not follow that their German mentors would be equally willing. The Germans do

not believe in the "little packets" policy. If they are at the back of the attempt to recover Bagdad, they will surely have insisted that the Turks should bring together an army large and formidable enough, as they think, to achieve its purpose. And we cannot be sure that they will be moved from their intention to recover Bagdad by the possibility of losing Jerusalem. If this theory be correct, it explains much of what has hitherto been obscure, and it furnishes the strongest reason why we should furnish our Palestine army with all that it needs in order that it may achieve its objects with rapidity and decision.

Armenian, Arab, and Jew

"The Council of the Armenian United Association of London having read in the Press that the British Government had now formally expressed its sympathy with the project for the reconstitution of Palestine as the National Home of the Jewish People, at their meeting held on November 10th, 1917, at the offices of the Association.

Resolved to record their unalloyed gratification and to convey their cordial congratulations and sincere and neighbourly greetings to the President, Dr. Ch. Weizmann, Committee, and members of the Zionist Federation of Great Britain, and through them to all other Zionist leaders and Zionist organisations, and especially those in the United States, Russia, France, Italy, Poland, and Roumania, upon the recognition of that Jewish nationality and their righteous and inalienable claim to the historic soil and country of their ancestry."

THE Resolution set out above will be welcomed by every man of political imagination whatever his race, as well as by every Jew. Between Armenian and Jew there are notable points of community. The persistence of Armenian nationality through long generations of oppression is one; the fellowship of suffering is another; a certain harmonising of East and West is a third. The survival of the Armenian nation is a political miracle only second in wonder to that of the Jews. If the Jews have preserved their

national quality in exile from their land, the Armenians have maintained the life and the hope of theirs under the heel of a foreign tyrant and sundered from the kindred West by a surrounding ocean of different and often hostile elements. Only a high moral fortitude and a rare spiritual virtue could sustain a nation under such circumstances: Of all the peoples who have suffered in this war none has passed through such torments as those of the Armenians. The Jews have known what it is to see brother armed against brother, to see their dwelling places trampled under the heel of contending armies, and their lives made a plaything by a tyrannical Government. But at least they have been spared the final extreme of misery—to be the victims of a systematic organised conspiracy by a Government aiming at the blotting out of a whole race. That has been the unhappy lot of the Armenians.

One may doubt whether even now it is commonly understood how terrible have been the massacres of the Armenians during the war. The Tartars slaughtered when they invaded Asia Minor, but they slaughtered their enemies. It was left to their spiritual children, the Young Turks, to carry their logic further, and to rest strategy and statesmanship upon the slaughter of their own subjects. The clique who hold Turkey in their power decided that it was politically expedient and profitable to individuals to extirpate the Armenians, and they have carried out their policy about as rigorously as such policies can be executed. It is an indelible stain upon the Germans that they did nothing to stop these atrocities, that some of them even collaborated in them. They will learn that this was a great blunder as well as a great crime.

The Allied policy in Turkey has been defined as the redemption and revival of the oppressed nationalities. Three nationalities have now been given by the Allies their char-

ter of liberty and nationhood—Jews, Arabs, and Armenians. These three peoples comprise the conscious nationalities of Turkey in Asia, and it is they who must be the architects of the new Middle East. Not all are at precisely the same stage of political and social evolution, but because they have a common task they cannot too soon learn to think of it as such. There is no occasion or warrant for rivalry between them. The sphere of each is clearly defined, and none can desire to imitate and transplant from Europe to the Middle East the vulgar ambition to dominate and expand generally which has brought these present miseries upon the world. We would urge, therefore, the leaders of the Jewish, the Armenian, and the Arab national movements to get into the habit of thinking of all three nations as co-workers in a noble work of civilisation in which each has his allotted task.

The Military Geography of Palestine

No country has so long a military history as Palestine, or one in which geography and politics have been so closely connected. In this brief article it is proposed to set down a few notes on the points of connection between the geography and history of Palestine, selecting those points which have a practical interest for us now.

The chief fact in the history of Palestine is the long road, that starting from Egypt runs between the hills of Judæa and Samaria on the one side and the sea on the other, and then crossing the shoulder of Mount Carmel by a choice of several easy passes enters the plain of Esdraelon, makes due east to the Jordan, which it crosses near Bethshan, and turning abruptly north reaches Damascus. This was the historic route for invasion both from the north and from the direction of Egypt. The principal points of importance on this road are Gaza, the gate on the side of the Sinai Desert; Megiddo, the chief of the passes from the Maritime Plain into Esdraelon, and Bethshan near the passage over Jordan. Never until the Roman Protectorate were these three strategic points in Jewish hands at one and the same time. This fact profoundly influenced the whole course of Jewish history. This great highway through the country was open to everyone but the Jews. The southern end in the hands of the Philistines barred the Jews from access to the sea. The Plain of Esdraelon, constantly overrun by invaders, separated Galilee so completely from Samaria that it is

hardly ever heard of in Old Testament history. The Northern Kingdom, lying open to the invader, was always in danger of losing its Jewish character and falling under the influence, temporal and spiritual, of its more powerful neighbours. Its hold on the country east of Jordan, again with Bethshan in hostile hands, was exceedingly precarious. In a word, the conditions for a vigorous political independence were absent. Complete control from end to end of this great highway is the first condition of a political Palestine. The second condition is free access to the sea on all sides—the Mediterranean Sea on the west, the Indian Seas at Akabah, and the sea of the desert. A third condition is a reasonably secure frontier on the north.

All the great military struggles of Biblical Jewish history were fought in and about this famous trunk road. Overlooking the Maritime Plain of Philistia are the Shephelah or Downs which are thrown forward like outworks in front of the great wall of the Judæan plateau. Here Samson performed his exploits; here the Philistines and the Jews raided each other. The old theocracy gave way to the monarchy because the rising power of the Philistines threatened to decapitate the northern half of Palestine from the south and the destruction of the first Royal house at Gilboa on the south side of Esdraelon shows how near they were to accomplishing their desires. The House of Judah then rose and fixed the capital of the kingdom at Jerusalem, which was conveniently protected by the natural ramparts of the hills. But the union of the country under Jerusalem was artificial, for the true centre of gravity was in Samaria, which was incomparably its richest portion. At the west end of the Plain of Esdraelon again were won Deborah's victories over Sisera, an Egyptian by his name, who from the neighbourhood of Acre ruled Galilee through Canaanitish feudatories, and at the

east end Gideon overthrew the Middianites; in the Pass of Megiddo, between Sharon and Esdraelon, Josiah, one of the last kings of Judah, now reduced to a tributary prince of Assyria, suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of an Egyptian invader, whose progress through the country he was attempting to arrest.

The later history of Palestine repeated on a larger scale the earlier military history of the Bible. Gaza has retained its importance as the gate to Palestine from the south right down from the yearly expeditions of Rameses through the times of the Maccabees and Alexander the Great to Napoleon and the present war. The Mohammedan Arabs conquered Palestine from over Jordan like the early Hebrews. The campaigns of Judas Maccabæus against the Greek Generals reproduced the early campaigns of the Israelites against the Philistines and foreshadowed the later campaigns of the Crusaders in the Vale of Ajalon against Saladin. Like Saladin, Judas defended the passage of the Shephelah against the manœuvres of Nicanor and the other Greeks. Bethshan, or Scythopolis, the scene of Saul's final defeat and of the most famous of Judas Maccabæus' razzias, was also the place at which the Arabs overthrew the Byzantines and a centre round which the hardest of Crusading battles were fought. The Latin Empire of Jerusalem broke up for precisely the same reasons as the Jewish Kingdoms failed to achieve eminence—namely, through its failure to maintain a good northern frontier. The strategy of the Crusades differs in that for the first time sea-power begins to play an important part in the history of Palestine. Thanks to the co-operation of the Italians, the Crusaders were able to advance along the coast. But the success of the first Crusade in capturing Jerusalem was due to the fact that the Mohammedans were divided and that the reinforcements expected from Egypt

did not arrive in time. The later Crusades tended to see in Egypt the real key to the East.

Over and over again in Jewish history we see the truth illustrated that the whole of the country from Egypt to the Tigris is, in a military sense, one. The motives of Roman policy in the first century of the Empire still remain to be elucidated, but it is difficult to resist the view that the pro-Jewish policy of Julius Cæsar was inspired not merely by sentimental gratitude to the Jews for their services, but also by the idea that the Jews might be useful to Rome in her Asiatic ambitions. The military eye of Julius Cæsar saw the immense importance of Palestine by reason of its position and also by the character of its inhabitants, and he would seem to have conceived the idea that they might be the interpreters of Rome to the East. On no other theory can we explain the persistently friendly policy of Antony to Herod in spite of the bitter jealousy of Cleopatra and the remarkable tolerance of Rome to Jerusalem in the first century. History following Josephus has always taken the view that the rising of the Jews against the Roman Empire under Nero was a mere outburst of wild fanaticism; but Josephus is, after all, a prejudiced witness. He was a renegade and the main object of his history is to justify the Imperial policy of Rome. But may there not have been something more than fanaticism in the Jewish rebellion? May they not have conceived the idea of founding in combination with Parthia, Empire of the East, extending from the borders of Egypt to Persia, anticipating by a few centuries the tremendous Empire of the Arabian Khalifs?

The main facts then in the military geography of Palestine are these:—(1) The great trunk road; (2) the great keep of the Judæan highlands, protected on the south by the great natural glacis of the stony Negeb, on the west

by the wall of the plateau and its outworks of the Shephelah, and on the north by a narrow *coupée* or drawbridge connecting the highlands of Judæa with Samaria; (3) the absence of any good natural frontier on the north or to the west beyond Jordan within the limits of the area over which the authority of the Jewish State extended. And these are the facts to keep steadily in mind in delimiting the future frontiers of Palestine.

The British Advance and the Jewish Colonies

I.—THE JUDEAN COLONIES

As the British armies advance into Palestine and the communiqués acquaint us with the details of their progress, many people will no doubt be puzzled by the fact that precisely those villages which may, not unlikely, prove to be the places of strongest resistance on the part of the enemy are not to be found on the ordinary maps. Those places are the Jewish Colonies, and it is a fact that up to the present the authors of most atlases and geographical treatises on Palestine have, either from ignorance or from prejudice against the Zionist idea, regularly omitted to mention those settlements. The omission will be particularly felt just now in the course of the advance of our troops because, apart from the superior value of these colonies (which may have suffered considerable damage at the hands of the retreating Turk), the Jewish Colonies are about the only stone-built villages in the plains of Philistia and Sharon, the Arab villages being uniformly built of unburnt bricks simply dried in the sun. It would thus be only natural for the enemy to cling especially to the Jewish Colonies as bases for his rearguard actions designed to delay our advance. In the announcement issued on the 14th instant by the War Office it is said that on the 12th inst. "Our troops captured the enemy's strongly entrenched posts at Mesmiyeh, Katrah, and Mughar." Now, Katrah is the third Jewish Colony which the British armies have met in their advance.

For the benefit of our readers we present a concise account of the Jewish Colonies that are situated in Judæa (1) in the Plain of Philistia, (2) in the hill country of the Shephelah, (3) in the mountains of Judah, (4) in the Plain of Sharon. The order given is that in which the armies are likely to meet these colonies, that is to say, from south to north.

(1) JEWISH COLONIES IN THE MARITIME PLAIN

1. *Ruchamah* (Arabic *Djemama*), situated about 11 miles east of Gaza. Founded in 1911 by a Society of Russian Jews from Moscow. 1,270 acres. Staple culture—wheat.

2. *Kastinieh* (Arabic *el-Kustineh*), situated about 17 miles north of Ruchamah, on the *Wady-el-Burshein*, a side-stream of the *Nahr Sukereir*. Founded in 1895 by Russian Jews. 1,600 acres. Population, 180. Staple culture—wheat, in lesser quantity sesame, barley, beans, and almond plantations.

3. *Gederah* (Arabic *Katrah*), six miles North of Kastinieh. Founded in 1884 by a group of Russian students. 1,360 acres. Population, 150. Staple product—almonds, also corn and wine.

4. *Huldah* (Arabic *Khuldeh*), seven miles east of Katrah, two miles north of the railway station Sedjed, at an altitude of 215 feet. Founded in 1909 by the Jewish National Fund, which has created there great olive groves in memory of Theodore Herzl, the creator and the first leader of the Zionist organisation. 455 acres. Population, 40.

5. *Ekron* (Arabic, *Akir*), the ancient Ekron, one of the five strong cities of the Philistines and the seat of the sanctuary of the famous God of flies, Baal-Zebub. Situated four miles north-east of Katrah on the road to Ram-

leh and Lydda, at an altitude of 200 feet. Founded in 1884 by Baron Edmund de Rothschild, of Paris, with Russian and Roumanian Jewish settlers. 3,570 acres. Population, 320. Staple product—wheat, also almond plantations and dairy farming.

6. *Rechoboth* (Arabic, *Dar'ân*), on the Wadi Dar'ân: the ancient *Shaaraïm* of the Bible, or *Tarin*, as it is named in the Talmud. Two-and-a-half miles north of Ekron and four miles south-west of Ramleh. Founded in 1890 by a group of Polish and Lithuanian Jews. 3,250 acres. Population, 900, inclusive of 270 Arabian Jews who have returned to Palestine from the Yemen. A very prosperous colony producing almonds, oranges, wines, and figs, also wheat, oats, melons, bananas, vegetables.

7. *Bir Yacob*. Two miles north-east of Rechoboth and two miles west of Ramleh. Founded in 1907 as a workingmen's settlement, inhabited partly by mountain Jews from the Caucasus. 500 acres. Population, 70. Almond plantations and vegetables.

8. *Wadi-el-Chanin*. Two miles north-west of Rechoboth and four miles west of Ramleh. Founded in 1882 by Jews from Russia, 760 acres. Population, 200. Orange and almond plantations.

9. *Rishon-le-Zion* (Arabic, *Ayûn Kara*). Four miles north of Rechoboth and five-and-a-half miles west of Lydda, at an altitude of 240 feet. Founded in 1882 by Russian Jews. 3,180 acres. Population 1,200. Principal centre of the wine industry in Palestine. Almost all the grapes of the Jewish Colonies of Judæa are manufactured here into wines, brandies, liqueurs, &c. Large wine-cellars, built by Baron Edmund de Rothschild, with a total capacity of 1,650,000 gallons. Vineyards, almond and orange plantations.

10. *Nachalath Yehudah*, on the northern outskirts of

Rishon-le-Zion. Workingmen's settlement founded in 1913 by the Odessa Committee of the "Lovers of Zion."

11. *Ben Shamen* about one mile north-east of Lydda. Estate of the Jewish National Fund. Founded in 1910. Population, 100. Large plantations of olive and other fruit trees; model dairy and poultry farm. Training farm for Jewish labourers.

12. *Mikveh-Israel*, about two miles south-east of Jaffa, on the road from that town to Jerusalem. Agricultural School of the *Alliance Israelite Universelle* of Paris. Founded in 1870. 625 acres. About 150 pupils. Headquarters of the Palestinian Society of Agriculture.

13. *Tel Aviv*, on the northern outskirts of Jaffa. The first modern Jewish urban settlement and garden-city in Palestine. Founded in 1909. Numerous schools. 180 houses. Population, 1,600.

(2) JEWISH COLONIES IN THE HILL COUNTRY (SHEPHELAH)

1. *Artuf*. At the entrance of the "Wady Surar" (Valley of Sorek), 20 miles east of Esdud (Ashdod), 13 miles west of Jerusalem, about one mile north-east of the station Deir Aban on the Jaffa-Jerusalem railway, on the site of the "Camp of Dan" of the Bible. Founded in 1896. 1,200 acres. Population, 100. Cereals, almond plantations.

2. *Kefar Uriah*. About halfway between Artuf and Huldah. Founded in 1913 by a group of Russian Zionists. 435 acres. At present being prepared for settlement by a group of 30 labourers.

3. *Abu Shushkeh*. The site of Gezer of the Bible. Five miles south-east of Ramleh and three miles north-east of Huldah. Founded in 1912. In preparation for settlement.

(3) JEWISH COLONY ON THE MOUNTAINS OF JUDAH

Mozah (Arabic, *Khurbet Beit Mizzah*). About four miles west of Jerusalem on the road to Jaffa. Founded in 1893. 250 acres. Vineyards, olive plantations, vegetables, wheat.

(4) JEWISH COLONIES IN THE PLAIN OF SHARON

1. *Petach Tikvah* (Arabic, *Mulebbis*). Eight miles north-east of Jaffa and 10 miles north of Lydda, near the River Audja. The largest of the Jewish Colonies. Founded in 1878. 8,000 acres. Population, 3,000. Great waterworks for irrigation purposes. Numerous schools, including an Elementary Agricultural School. Vines, oranges, lemons, almonds, cereals, dairy farming. Wages paid to Arab labourers, about one million francs per annum. Value of the land has increased twelve-fold since 1890. The total value of the colony has increased from £1,200 in 1880 to more than £600,000 in 1914.

2. *Ain Ganim*. On the north-eastern outskirts of Petach-Tikvah. Workingmen's settlement. Founded in 1910. 700 acres. Population, 100.

3. *Kefar Saba* (Arabic, *Kafr Saba*). Fourteen miles north-east of Jaffa, on the road to Haifa and 19 miles west of Nablus. Workingmen's settlement. Founded in 1904. 1,750 acres. Almost exclusively almond plantations, also olive groves and eucalyptuses.

The above are the Jewish Colonies of Judæa, such as they existed at the outbreak of the war and up to the time of the British advance. For although the Jewish population of Jaffa has entirely, and that of the Jewish Colonies in part, been evacuated by the Turks in the course of last

spring, the colonies do not appear to have suffered any appreciable damage at all before the present advance began. Even if the houses and other buildings should have been destroyed, it is not likely that the whole of the plantations would meet with the same fate; and, considering that the principal wealth of the colonies is represented by these plantations which have taken more than a generation to create, urgent steps should be taken to render possible the saving of such trees as can yet be saved, just as our French Allies have done in their re-conquered provinces of the north of France.

In the first place, it will be necessary to provide at once for properly-equipped detachments of agricultural labourers who know the colonies and the way to handle their various kinds of fruit trees; such labourers, as well as the agricultural experts required for the direction of this work of restoration, are no doubt available in Egypt among the Jewish refugees from Palestine. The problem is a little more complicated in the case of the orange groves and other plantations which cannot be grown without irrigation. Fortunately, here the irrigation season has just come to an end and will not re-open until April. The winter months should be used for the cleaning of the wells and the repair or renewing of the pumps and motors; for, as is shown by the reports which have come from Gaza since the capture of that town by our troops, the retreating Turks have filled all the wells with rubbish after having destroyed the machinery. Mechanics and other artisans for this work should also be available in Egypt, for the Palestinian Jewish refugees will only be too glad to be allowed to return at the earliest possible moment to Palestine in order to start to build up again the ruined colonies. It will also be necessary to provide for the immediate preparation of the soil of the occupied regions for new cereal

crops, both for the needs of our armies and for the needs of the returning refugees.

*The offices of the British Palestine Committee are at
Palatine Bank Buildings, Norfolk Street, Manchester
and all inquiries should be addressed to the Secretary.*

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